
Russian President Vladimir Putin attends Easter Mass at the Orthodox Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow, Russia. from May of 2021: the reality is that the image of Putin as a conservative restorer is a political narrative, in the same way that former Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic reinvented himself, going from communist apparatchik to Serbian nationalist leader| Photo: EFE/EPA/SERGEI GUNEYEV/SPUTNIK/KREMLIN
The Russian invasion of Ukraine will probably be one of the most important events of this young 21st century, ending decades of relative stability among European states. While its effects on geopolitics, markets and elections are yet to come, the invasion will likely continue to open up a divide in the US right. A small faction of US conservatives (small but increasingly visible and potentially influential) see a friend and role model in Vladimir Putin. But they are wrong to do so. Putin is not our friend. Nor is your Russia an example for US conservatism.
Conservatives should know the reality of Russia’s social situation, they should know how incompatible American national interests are and how Putin’s governance does not serve the United States. If you make the mistake of scanning Twitter or reading the comments section of newspapers, it’s not hard to find voices asking why on earth we would have tensions with Russia, given that Putin is a conservative leader who has done so much good. While it’s all too easy to find animalistic opinions on the internet, it’s not too difficult to find influential conservative figures roaring these topics. These views range from mere skepticism of the common conservative consensus to openly praising Putin’s invasion threads. Possibly the most strident in his admiration is Pat Buchanan, a former employee of the Reagan administration and a quintessential paleoconservative. Buchanan firmly views Putin as a “bastion of traditional values” and praised Russia as a place where “conservatives, traditionalists and nationalists from all continents” can ally themselves. They couldn’t be more wrong. For example, it is unbelievable to imagine that an ex-KGB agent is some kind of lover of the truth. Indeed, the realities of Putin’s Russia point to a less rosy and more cynical view. For example, for all the talk of traditional values, Russia’s religiosity remains very low. With 6% church attendance, Russia barely stays ahead of very secular countries such as Norway and Sweden. Even more worrying is the abortion rate. Although it continues to decline after the end of the Soviet era (as it does in the United States, largely because of the success of the pro-life movement), it is still dramatically higher than in the United States. Far from leading a traditional social revival, Putin’s Russia continues to slide into demographic decline. The reality is that the image of Putin as a conservative restorer is a political narrative, in the same way that former Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic reinvented himself, going from apparatchik communist to Serbian nationalist leader. Traveling writer Colin Thubron’s discussion with a Russian citizen highlights the superficial nature of this form of conservatism in his book The Amur River: Between Russia and China :
“I mutter something about the resilience of those who have faith. She suddenly flares up: ‘Oh! We had no faith! My father was a communist and my mother was an atheist! We were all atheists!’ She laughs at my bewilderment. ‘We would buy paint to decorate Easter eggs too, in secret. But nobody believed in the Resurrection!’ She added, as if informing me, ‘There is no God.’ She had walked to the Church out of habit, not pity. ‘I think people live by tradition, not faith… That statue in Lenin Square… He is a part of who we are.’”
Most importantly: the United States and Russia have conflicting national interests. Any “America First” approach to foreign policy that seeks to anchor US policy to concrete interests must prioritize those interests over Russia’s. What interests are these? There is broad consensus that a vital core of American interest is to ensure the physical security of the United States and to prevent attacks on the homeland. One of the main ways the US sought to achieve was to ensure that a great power could not attack them. As strategist George Friedman wrote in his book The Next