Putin is no role model for US conservatives

O presidente russo, Vladimir Putin, participa da missa de Páscoa na Catedral Ortodoxa de Cristo Salvador em Moscou, Rússia, 02 de maio de 2021

Russian President Vladimir Putin attends Easter Mass at the Orthodox Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow, Russia. from May of 2021: the reality is that the image of Putin as a conservative restorer is a political narrative, in the same way that former Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic reinvented himself, going from communist apparatchik to Serbian nationalist leader| Photo: EFE/EPA/SERGEI GUNEYEV/SPUTNIK/KREMLIN

The Russian invasion of Ukraine will probably be one of the most important events of this young 21st century, ending decades of relative stability among European states. While its effects on geopolitics, markets and elections are yet to come, the invasion will likely continue to open up a divide in the US right. A small faction of US conservatives (small but increasingly visible and potentially influential) see a friend and role model in Vladimir Putin. But they are wrong to do so. Putin is not our friend. Nor is your Russia an example for US conservatism.

Conservatives should know the reality of Russia’s social situation, they should know how incompatible American national interests are and how Putin’s governance does not serve the United States. If you make the mistake of scanning Twitter or reading the comments section of newspapers, it’s not hard to find voices asking why on earth we would have tensions with Russia, given that Putin is a conservative leader who has done so much good. While it’s all too easy to find animalistic opinions on the internet, it’s not too difficult to find influential conservative figures roaring these topics. These views range from mere skepticism of the common conservative consensus to openly praising Putin’s invasion threads. Possibly the most strident in his admiration is Pat Buchanan, a former employee of the Reagan administration and a quintessential paleoconservative. Buchanan firmly views Putin as a “bastion of traditional values” and praised Russia as a place where “conservatives, traditionalists and nationalists from all continents” can ally themselves. They couldn’t be more wrong. For example, it is unbelievable to imagine that an ex-KGB agent is some kind of lover of the truth. Indeed, the realities of Putin’s Russia point to a less rosy and more cynical view. For example, for all the talk of traditional values, Russia’s religiosity remains very low. With 6% church attendance, Russia barely stays ahead of very secular countries such as Norway and Sweden. Even more worrying is the abortion rate. Although it continues to decline after the end of the Soviet era (as it does in the United States, largely because of the success of the pro-life movement), it is still dramatically higher than in the United States. Far from leading a traditional social revival, Putin’s Russia continues to slide into demographic decline. The reality is that the image of Putin as a conservative restorer is a political narrative, in the same way that former Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic reinvented himself, going from apparatchik communist to Serbian nationalist leader. Traveling writer Colin Thubron’s discussion with a Russian citizen highlights the superficial nature of this form of conservatism in his book The Amur River: Between Russia and China :

“I mutter something about the resilience of those who have faith. She suddenly flares up: ‘Oh! We had no faith! My father was a communist and my mother was an atheist! We were all atheists!’ She laughs at my bewilderment. ‘We would buy paint to decorate Easter eggs too, in secret. But nobody believed in the Resurrection!’ She added, as if informing me, ‘There is no God.’ She had walked to the Church out of habit, not pity. ‘I think people live by tradition, not faith… That statue in Lenin Square… He is a part of who we are.’”

Most importantly: the United States and Russia have conflicting national interests. Any “America First” approach to foreign policy that seeks to anchor US policy to concrete interests must prioritize those interests over Russia’s. What interests are these? There is broad consensus that a vital core of American interest is to ensure the physical security of the United States and to prevent attacks on the homeland. One of the main ways the US sought to achieve was to ensure that a great power could not attack them. As strategist George Friedman wrote in his book The Next

Years [Os próximos cem anos], this has been the guiding star of the United States since the Monroe Doctrine. The US macro strategy dictates that not only ensure that no great power dominates the Northern Hemisphere, but also ensure that no single power dominates the Eurasian continent.

Realistically, there are few states that can pose such a threat: namely, the People’s Republic of China, Russia, India and Germany. The last two were successfully brought into American orbit. From being a power in the 19th and 20th centuries, Germany became a non-nuclear power aligned with the interests of the United States by treaty. In Asia, the United States shifted its focus from the Middle East to the Pacific Ocean region in order to counter China, a strategy wisely expanded by the Trump administration.

Only Russia. The United States does, in fact, have objectives compatible with Russian interests. Stability in Central Asia and the Middle East, as well as nuclear security, are the two biggest issues, among others, on which US lawmakers can find common ground with Russia. However, as this invasion demonstrates (and Putin’s abominable speech justifying it), Putin’s goals in Europe are much broader than many naive people imagined.

Instead of simply seeking a NATO shrinkage, Putin has shown that he believes it is Russia’s right to exercise an armed veto over the American relations with the entire continent, with the aim of rendering NATO entirely obsolete. Geopolitically, this would take Europe back to the times when wars on the continent were commonplace. It is unrealistic to imagine that the United States, after being dragged into bloody European wars in the 20th century, would be isolated from the negative effects of a chaotic Europe in the 21st century.

The American balance of power in Europe not only led to the end of Soviet communism and power wars, but also ushered in an era unprecedented level of peace and prosperity. It would not be caution, but imprudence, to throw away an eighty-year-old strategy because those who challenge your stance are our ideological allies.

Furthermore, American conservatism has nothing functional to learn from Putin’s ideology and governance. While some admirers might point to Putin’s belief in Europe’s historic heritage, in fact the similarities are so vague they can be very nebulous. It would be almost as useful as pointing to the Islamic State’s belief in God as opposed to anarchism as the basis for an ideological partnership.

American conservatism is not rooted in a half-Soviet nostalgia, nor in a hope of restoring the orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality of Tsar Nicholas. Instead, American conservatism seeks to preserve the specific mix of influences, as Russell Kirk so well explained in his Roots of American Order. Kirk lists Jerusalem, Athens, Rome, and London as sources of American identity and politics.

Thanks to Russia’s Orthodox heritage, there will always be some affinity between Russian and American civilizations. However, early British and Protestant influences, combined with the effects of colony settlement, the Revolution, and the expansion of borders, indicate that American conservatism is inevitably different. Just as it would be a mistake to claim that historic American conservatism is just libertarianism, the American emphasis on constitutional rights, localism, and republican virtue would be alien to the Russian experience. It would not be conservatism, but radicalism, to want to rip out all historical influence in a country and exchange it for another totally alien to the experience and culture of your country.

For now, it is unlikely that Putinism will become a common position among conservatives. Polls by Republicans show a concern for Putin’s Russia that generally aligns with the justifiably negative American view, if not more pronounced. However, as voices have been raised to praise Putinism, we must always remember how unreasonable this is. Far from being an inspiration for responsible statesmanship and cooperation, Putin’s Russia is a hostile competitor that seeks to undermine American national interests while hiding its own decline behind a fantasy of traditionalism. The last thing conservatives should do is needlessly incense a foreign autocrat.

)JOSEPH S. LAUGHON is a graduate of Concordia University, Irvine, and lives in California, where he writes about religion, politics, and National security.

©02174011 National Review. Published with permission. Original in English.02174011

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