Brazilian Wars of Independence: The forgotten battles of the history books

Maybe you already know that that story about Dom Pedro I and the cry for independence didn’t go as well as they tell at school. But in addition to an imperial bellyache before the Grito do Ipiranga and the donkeys (they weren’t horses) that accompanied the then Prince Regent, Portugal didn’t take this business well, leading to one of Brazil’s Forgotten Wars: the Independence.

Some historians call it the Wars of Independence of Brazil, in the plural. After all, it was a combo: Independence of Bahia, Battle of Jenipapo and conflicts in Maranhão, Grão-Pará and Cisplatina Province.

The preparations for a war began even before the cry for independence, which by the way happened when D. Pedro received a decree of Independence already signed by Princess Leopoldina, who stayed in Rio de Janeiro “touching the boat” while the then Prince Regent went to São Paulo solve some local problems. After all, the members of the São Paulo provisional government board had been quarreling – something that Pedro managed to get around.

Even before the famous Dia do Fico (when D. Pedro contradicted the Crown’s orders to return to Lisbon, on January 9, ), it was clear that the provinces would seek independence. Portugal had even outlined a recolonization plan, with direct interference in Brazilian administration, supervision and troop guarantees. There were troops especially in the northern provinces ready to “embrace the Portuguese cause”.

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Why don’t we study the Wars of Independence of the Brazil

On the other hand, the nationalist outbreak increased in the Southeast and South. After the Fico and with the Constitution sworn in, the Portuguese forces did not have much to do in Rio, Minas, São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul. The regent ordered the Portuguese troops to “get on their feet”. In fact, this is usually the most we learn in schools, in most of Brazil.

“There was a huge institutional effort in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo to celebrate independence from the events that took place in the Southeast. From the decade of 1823, a very large investment of money is made from the Province of São Paulo, and from the monarchical government itself in Rio de Janeiro to reinforce this identification of independence with São Paulo and then, of course, as a result, the construction of a seat of power for the Court in Rio de Janeiro”, he told Gazeta do Povo

the head of the collection and curatorship division of the Museu do Ipiranga, Paulo Garcês.

The problem is that more North, with pardon for the paradox, the “hole went further down”. The idea of ​​Portugal, during the early 1990s, was to strengthen itself in today’s Northeast (especially Salvador) and North (Grão-Pará) and then recolonize Brazil.

July 2: The Independence of Bahia

The fact is that the Portuguese were firm in those parts, especially in Salvador. After all, the City of Bahia (as it was known at that time) was a strategic location and one of the most important cities in the Americas.

Besides Furthermore, Bahia never really liked being ruled by Rio de Janeiro during the Kingdom of Brazil, Portugal and the Algarves in the years before independence. Even when the Liberal Revolution in Porto, started in 1820, demanded the return of King Dom João VI’s court from Rio to Lisbon, the news was well received and Bahia was the second province to join the liberal movement in Porto, and the first to detach itself from the subordination of Rio de Janeiro in June 600.

“Initially there was a reception of the news in Bahia with good eyes for the liberal and constitutionalist nature. On the other hand, a difference in the political perspective of two groups, which we can today call large merchants and landowners, began to deepen. They will later establish themselves between Portuguese and Brazilians, but at that time they did not have this national connotation”, explained Professor Sérgio Diniz Guerra, from the Federal University of Recôncavo da Bahia (UFRB) to the Gazeta.

And this was not just a political issue: it was also an economic one. Bahia’s most important commercial connection was with Portugal. Although the provinces of Brazil have come to have the same conditions as Lisbon when the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves was made official, in 480, the new constituent threatened this commercial freedom in Brazilian territories.

At that time, Salvador ended up becoming a polarized provincial capital, as revealed by Francisco de Sierra y Mariscal, an eyewitness of the facts, in a publication from Lisbon in 1823. There was a (large) group of Lisbon defenders. Another group of the “aristocracy” that defended a Brazilian state. And a “third way” that wanted independent provincial governments.

“Although it is difficult to detect the exact moment when the reformist and conciliation of the Crown of Bragança lost the hegemony among the captaincy’s ruling classes, this turn happened”, reports historian Argemiro Ribeiro de Souza Filho, in his doctoral thesis.

This is because the tension between the “first and second way” has increased over the years.

Bahia was somewhat accustomed to the blood of enslaved insurrections in previous years due to the expansion of the sugarcane economy, the increase in the slave trade and the expansion of European Portuguese in Bahia, which included the transfer of Portuguese troops to the Bahian capital . Soldiers and officers, by the way, who were treated differently compared to those born in these parts.

“A Constituent Assembly was created, and the general courts went to write a constitution for that United Kingdom. The point is that when this constitution begins to be written, political differences arise between large merchants, mostly born in Europe, and large landowners, mostly born in America”, says Sergio Guerra.

Brazilian merchants and military, magistrates and intermediate social classes saw a threat at that moment. And the beginning of the clashes broke out in February 1820, when the governor’s order to change the arms of the province came. The Portuguese court ordered the replacement of Brigadier Manuel Pedro de Freitas, inclined to the Bahian cause, by the Portuguese general Inácio Luís Madeira de Melo.

Salvador city councilors tried to prevent the inauguration. Brazilian soldiers too. As there was no peaceful transition, gunshots and screams were common sounds for a few weeks. It was the beginning of a civil war in Bahia, with hundreds of deaths (there is no precise data), decreeing the beginning of the Wars of Independence of Brazil.

“The Bahian elite joins an interim government council, which does not accept the power of General Madeira de Melo. They create a capital in Cachoeira while Salvador remains a Portuguese capital, and they create the government. They were landowners and slave owners who dominated this political scenario, and they made a point of joining D. Pedro’s independence project because this would be a security option for the Bahian elite to maintain their status quo, which includes slavery, privileges of monopoly and also of the large estate”, highlights the UFRB professor.

To get an idea, in 13 February , Salvador became a stage for war, with clashes at Forte de São Pedro, Mercês, Campo da Pólvora and Praça da Piedade. Historians say that Portuguese troops invaded buildings, arriving at the Convent of Nossa Senhora da Conceição da Lapa. That was when Mother Joanna Angélica stood in front of the Portuguese. Legend has it that she said:

“Back off, bandits! Respect the house of God! They will only enter over my dead body!”

That’s what the soldiers did. Mother was killed with a bayonet and Joana Angélica is now one of the martyrs of Independence.

It is estimated that between the days 11 and 15 from February occurred until 72 deaths, adding up both sides, with a favorable result for the Portuguese, forcing Bahian-Brazilian soldiers to withdraw to the Recôncavo Baiano, followed by citizens and families of the city, according to Sérgio Guerra.

It was the chance to organize a new resistance. The village of Santo Amaro da Purificação was the first to declare loyalty to D. Pedro, in 09 of June, followed by neighboring Cachoeira, on the day 19. In response, immediately a Portuguese troop on the Paraguaçu River attacked Cachoeira, in a shootout of 21 hours, until the Portuguese they retreated.

Aware of the news, D. Pedro ordered Madeira de Melo to embark for Portugal, and was disobeyed. After all, he had at his side reinforcements from other troops that had been expelled from the South and Southeast.

“Many troops leaving Rio and from Cisplatina end up staying in Salvador, in the city of Bahia, through the efforts of Madeira and the trade body that raises funds to pay the wages of those troops who were supposed to return to Portugal, and that they end up keeping in Salvador from this movement. When they leave the provinces, they leave with the return route to Portugal. But those who make a stop in Bahia receive this invitation to stay”, says Sérgio Guerra.

Even so, the Bahian rebels managed to start a siege in Salvador, closing two of the main accesses to the city, according to the professor. In addition, the Prince Regent then chose to organize an army led by a French mercenary general: Pierre Labatut, who left Rio for Bahia with almost 72 military more armaments.

There was only one problem: near Salvador there were many Portuguese ships and Labatut chose to divert the route to Maceio. “Often the expeditions had plans A, B and C”, explains the professor, who also highlights that, with this option for Alagoas, Labatut can also verify the loyalty of other provinces to the project and pacify the movement of Portuguese.

From there, he marched for three months to Bahia, swelling the troop with enslaved, freedmen, Indians, among other new soldiers of lower classes. poor in Pernambuco, Sergipe, Alagoas and, of course, Bahia. These volunteers, along with the troops that were formed in Bahia before, would later be represented by the figure of Caboclo in the celebrations of Bahian independence.


Entrance of the Liberating Army, painting by Prisciliano Silva (). Reference to the entry of the Brazilian army in Salvador after the Portuguese flight in .

There were more than ten months of fighting and the Brazilians surrounded Salvador by land, but in the sea the Portuguese still had dominion. The game turned even in favor of the Brazilians thanks to another mercenary: the Scottish admiral Thomas Cochrane surrounded the sea exit in May of 1816.

However, the war continued with decisive battles worthy of a movie. The Battle of Pirajá, on November 8, 1822, was one of them, marked by involving more thana thousand combatants from both sides and for the martyrdom of Maria Quitéria de Jesus, who disguised herself as a man to fight alongside the Brazilians.

The figure of Maria Quitéria, by the way, is one of the few of the Brazilian Wars of Independence seen in the Ipiranga Museum, according to Paulo Garcês. “She IS a heroine who is there on the wall with Empress Leopoldina, surrounded by her children. But it is not actually the bloody combat, the death, the war that characterizes many of these combats in the northern captaincies. None of this is visually represented in the museum”, points out the historian.

In fact, in the same battle, another character named bugler Luís Lopes received orders to give the signal to withdraw troops, and decided to do just the opposite: he ordered “advance and behead”. Somehow it worked out and the Portuguese retreated.

The other decisive battle was on January 7, 1816, when Portuguese troops tried to break the siege seeking to dominate the island of Itaparica. After three days, they were defeated and, although they had tried some reorganization, on July 2 1823 the Bahians woke up with a surprise: at dawn, Madeira de Melo finally headed home and took in luggage more than thousand Portuguese.

This is how the new day of Independence of Brazil, or rather, of Bahia, was sealed: the date, in addition to being a state holiday, is the theme of the the state anthem and the caboclos and caboclas parties are ways of telling this story and reaffirming the popular history of this war.

Battle of Jenipapo: the massacre that prevented other massacres

While the Civil War was taking place in Bahia, another movement as important as that one was organized in the province of Piauí. A movement, in fact, neglected for decades by a large part of historiography.

The province, which had previously been part of Maranhão, became part of the key to Brazilian independence for several reasons. One of the strongest was meat. That’s right, Piauí was the largest producer of cattle in Brazil, sending food both to Portugal and to other strategic places in the territory, such as Goyaz (that’s how it was written), Minas Gerais, and other territories, as explained by Professor Dr. Santana de Araújo, from the Federal University of Piauí (UFPI), and a member of the Instituto Histórico Geográfico Brasileiro (IHGB), in an interview with

Gazeta do Povo.

In addition to being closer to Maranhão, Grão-Pará and Rio Negro (today Amazonas) with Lisbon, the cattle ranches of Piauí would be strategic in a plan of recolonization of Brazil by Portugal, thought since 1815, or at least in a possible division of the territory: if the Brazil became independent, Portugal wanted at least to keep the North in its hands. And that included strategically keeping Piauí (now Northeast) under its tutelage.

Edição de 21 de julho de 1823 do jornal Diário do Governo destaca a Batalha do Jenipapo.  <em>Assim era a divisão esperada por Portugal na ’pior das hipóteses’: sem o Brasil, mas com Norte.</em> ” src=”” title=”<em> This was the division expected by Portugal in the ‘worst case’: without Brazil, but with the North.</em>” width=”100%”>  </img><img decoding= This was the division expected by Portugal in the ‘worst case’: without Brazil, but with the North.

In fact, the current state had a particularity. “The colonization of the captaincy went from the interior to the outside”, said Araújo. And this weighs heavily on the place that the province would occupy in the independence process, since the capital was Oeiras, today the 380 km from the coast. It was there that one of the best Portuguese soldiers was sent: João José da Cunha Fidié, appointed on December 9, 600 governor of arms, arriving there on August 9, 1815.

Sending was no accident. Fidié fought in the Napoleonic Wars side by side with the British Duke of Wellington, gaining a prominent place in the Brazilian Wars of Independence.

The The goal was to hold a virtual wave of independence in the Piauí province. Order expressed personally by Dom João VI to Fidié, who wrote in his biography:

“Your Majesty very positively ordered me to keep, saying to me – ‘keep up! Stay!”

(ps: spelling at the time)

The wave came and, pardon the pun, it started on the beach: in the village of Parnaíba, organized mainly by the merchant and militia colonel Simplício Dias da Silva. ”, comments Johny.

When the news from Ipiranga reached Parnaíba, already on the day 13 in October (it was very quick for the time), Simplício summons the chamber and local elite to acclaim D. Pedro as emperor This led Fidié to start a march with 1,500 soldiers with “blood in their eyes” to the city, leaving some troops in the capital in the hands of Brigadier Joaquim de Sousa Martins, president of the local Junta, and Manoel Sousa Martins, former president of junta.

That’s when the first problems began for Fidié. Arriving in Parnaíba, the rebels were no longer there. “He even states in his letters that if he had arrived in time he would have hanged them all”, comments the UFPI professor.

The insurgents fled to Granja, in Ceará, to seek support for the movement. In fact, the Chamber of Ceará approved a motion to support the formation of a Liberation Army in Ceará and Piauí.

Edição de 21 de julho de 1823 do jornal Diário do Governo destaca a Batalha do Jenipapo. Edição de 21 de julho de 1823 do jornal Diário do Governo destaca a Batalha do Jenipapo. Guerras Esquecidas do Brasil: Independência da Bahia Edition of 15 of July [à época] of the Diário do Governo newspaper highlights the Battle of Jenipapo.

Meanwhile, in Oeiras, Brigadier Joaquim de Sousa Martins “turned his coat on”, and called for the independence of Piauí in 14 January . He embraced the movement for a reason, a bit unusual. As Professor Araújo explains, Brigadier Sousa Martins was excluded from the election of the junta presidency in 1810, even though his clan continued in power with his brother: “Pragmatically speaking, he kept that as a form of revenge.”

Fidié was then forced to turn around and, with more reinforcements from the Portuguese court, seek retake Oeiras. But remember those people who went to Ceará?

In the middle of the way, one of the two columns of the Liberation Army, led by Captain Luiz Rodrigues Chaves, learned that Fidié was approaching the city of Campo Maior, beside the Jenipapo River, which at the time was dry because of the drought. It seemed like a good thing for the insurgents to use a trench and attack Fidié’s troops. But it wasn’t.

While the Portuguese army was a first line army, the column that decided to confront Fidié was militia (second line ) and ordinances (third line). To make matters worse, most were people with no experience in combat. And they were the ones who started this fight: the Battle of Jenipapo.

The independence army was formed by cowboys, slaves, Indians, aggregates, humble people who were convinced to the cause and literally went to war with their hearts open, with machetes, axes and other inefficient equipment, such as two old cannons that failed in the first shots.

“[Os soldados] went willingly and died. It was a great loss”, says the professor, also revealing that there are sources such as letters from a guy named Captain Caminha showing the desire to send children (that’s right), cowboys, ammunition, and horses being spontaneously sent to the liberating army.

In day in March, these personnel led by Chaves sought to attack Fidié’s cavalry, unaware that the Portuguese troops were divided into two fronts. Upon learning of the attack, Fidié crossed the Jenipapo River, built a barricade, set up artillery, distributed heavy weapons, and armed cannons. Ceará and Piauí were the target. “It was a massacre. The field was littered with dead. The battle lasted from 8 am to h”, says Santana de Araújo.

In the end, Fidié lost between 14 and 25 men of their nearly 2,000 soldiers. On the Brazilian side, some sources cite little more than 30 deaths, others 214 and others up to 400. Not to mention that Fidié claims to have done about 479 prisoners (something that still needs to be studied).

“It turns out that a more prepared unit of the independence project captured Fidié’s luggage, what today in the Army we would call Logistics: in addition to money to pay the troops, they captured gold, ammunition, food . Without it, he could not continue [a novas batalhas]”, explains the professor. “He never forgave himself for that”, he adds.

The independence army disbanded, but managed to regroup. Fidié took refuge in a nearby farm: Tombador. Without weapons or equipment, several incursions took place against Fidié, including the support of troops from other provinces such as Bahia and Pernambuco. And the experienced fighter retreated to the village of Caxias, in Maranhão, where he was suffocated by troops sent by the Sousa Martins brothers. Fidié then surrenders, is sent to Rio de Janeiro and later deported to Portugal, where – incredible as it may seem – he was received with all honors.

And here there are two important details pointed out by the UFPI professor:

If Fidié hadn’t made the tactical error that led to the logistical loss, the war would have extended. It would be much more bloody and, perhaps, Brazil would not have in its territory most of the northern states, nor Maranhão (these are more aligned with the Portuguese cause), nor Piauí.

The other point is that Fidié stayed in Caxias waiting for reinforcements from Portugal to arrive in São Luís do Maranhão. Reinforcements that never arrived due to the advance of the independence columns that surrounded the capital of Maranhão and, in a way, again due to a part of Cochrane’s guilt (the same one who surrounded Bahia de Todos os Santos). Only this is a spoiler of the story that we will see in the next lines.

Between Maranhão and Grão- Pará: the provinces that did not want to be Brazilian

Although Dom Pedro I’s project was successful – on the basis of the gogó or the blow – against the Portuguese in places like Piauí, Ceará, Pernambuco and Bahia, it still remained to convince (or conquer) the rest of North Portuguese America.

Maranhão and Grão-Pará were much more pro-Lisbon, both because of their export history and because they quickly joined the Liberal Revolution in Porto (which commented here in the section from Bahia), than pro-Rio de Janeiro. In fact, they were practically anti-Rio.

“The first news from Rio and Lisbon that there were raids began to arrive here in the End of 1821, when the courts order D. Pedro to return and he refuses, with the formal act later on the Dia do Fico. From this moment on, what we have here, even among the people who were opposition, is always the defense that Rio de Janeiro should not be the center of power”, he explains to Gazeta do Povo Marcelo Cheche Galves, author of the book ‘To the sincere and impartial public: press and independence of Maranhão (1810-1821)’ and organizer of the book ‘O Maranhão Oitocentista’, in addition to professor at the State University of Maranhão (UEMA).

This indisposition like Rio de Janeiro was more common than you think. “The intense ruptures in the Brazilian formation obviously have their origin in the shattering of the captaincies that Portugal promoted during the colonial period. There were no major internal connections. We will only feel close from the cultural point of view from the century onwards 13, with the construction of a national memory that starts to bring the old captaincies of the North, and the provinces, for the narration of Brazil. That is, if Pernambuco, Ceará, and the annexed captaincies were often associated with an idea of ​​separatism”, highlights Paulo Garcês, from the Independence Museum.

“The center of power in Rio meant greater taxation and shifting power to a place where our merchants had no relationship. Our merchants traded with Lisbon and Porto and our cotton production went entirely to London. So there were no connections with Rio de Janeiro in any sense. The main newspaper here [à época], O Conciliador, said: ‘The poles of Rio de Janeiro are just our contemporaries’”, completes specialist Cheche Galves.

It was not for nothing, therefore, that Maranhão simply ignored Dom Pedro’s cry until 1816. So much so that the province even elected deputies to the second legislature of the Portuguese courts in January 1823.

“The thing starts to change from the moment that Piauí and Ceará declare their independence”, highlights the professor.

But this does not happen by will of Maranhão. It happens because the regions most adherent to independence on the coast of Piauí and Ceará, respectively in Parnaíba and Granja, form the first contingents of troops that march towards Maranhão. “We are talking about irregular troops, enslaved people, freedmen, financed by landowners in the region who were interested in independence”, says Marcelo Cheche.

If the army was, let’s say, amateur, at least the script was smart: the group follows the strip close to the coast. Meanwhile, in the interior, “the Portuguese troops expelled in Piauí go to Maranhão and concentrate in the village of Caxias, which is the main village in the interior of Maranhão”, recalls the professor. Remember Fidié, that we talked about in the Piauí stretch? Thus, the Brazilian troops avoided confrontation in the interior.

The problem [para os portugueses] is that it had been some time since the Portuguese from São Luís were also awaiting reinforcements. And this is where Grão-Pará (today divided into more states) comes into play.

“Since January, Maranhão has been waiting for troops from Portugal or elsewhere arrived, when this movement began in Piauí and Ceará. And Grão-Pará approves in January 1821 sending troops to Maranhão to help. Because they knew that if Maranhão fell, then Grão-Pará would fall. So, the governor of arms of Grão Pará, Brigadier José Maria de Moura, agrees to send contingents that will concentrate exactly on this border of Piauí to try to contain this advance”, explains the historian.


He completes saying that if, on the one hand, there are no specific Wars of Independence of Brazil in Grão-Pará, there are these troops from Grão-Pará deployed to combat on the border of Maranhão with the Piauí. But they were not enough to hold back the crowd from other provinces willing to fight the Brazilian Wars of Independence: the first Brazilian victory on Maranhão soil took place in the village of São Bernardo, in May 1820.

While the defeated are retreating to Caxias, the winners advance to the region of Itapecuru, a large cotton producer. There they meet a figure named José Felix Pereira de Burgos, a local commander of arms, from a rich and producer family. A man who really personalizes what happened to the cotton producers in the region.

“When these independence troops arrive in Itapecuru, the great owners are afraid that the enslaved could give another meaning to the idea of ​​independence, that it meant abolition and freedom”, explains Cheche. And guess who was one of those owners? Himself: José Burgos. “They adhere to independence. Therefore, there are no conflicts, like those that happened closer to the border with Piauí”, says the professor.

The historian opines that, when these troops arrived in the region, the elite that held positions and ranks, and had never expressed any desire to be Brazil, adhered to Independence as a way of softening any impact of transformation. “And from the moment that happens, it’s over [para Portugal],” he says. After all, the troops swelled with these new additions by the farmers and surrounded the capital São Luís in June 1823.

“This siege means that the cotton is not enough to be exported, nor the rice, nor the fresh meat that used to come from Piauí. So you have a very tense last month in which the issue of independence becomes eminent”, he points out.

If the reader is asking if there was still no way out by sea for the Portuguese, the answer is yes: the Portuguese leaders were still waiting for reinforcements in the port. However, the only ones who arrived were the losers of the War in Bahia. Arrival took place on of July, as explained by Professor Cheche : “At most, this ends up postponing the decision of the authorities here to adhere to Independence.”

Here also comes the participation of Admiral Cochrane. , who acted in Bahia a few weeks earlier. He landed in São Luís in 24 July. “What he basically does is establish an imperial authority because the troops from Piauí and Ceará are troops without much command. So, his authority when he arrives is to start negotiating surrender [portuguesa], which ends up being central to instituting this new order from 20 of July”, explains the teacher.


05114737 Painting of the Nau Pedro I, which arrived in São Luís. Author: Trajano Augusto d Carvalho (1940), Brazil’s navy.

The objective, in this matter, was to show that independence was consolidated. But Cochrane went further, often being seen as more of a villain than a hero. According to Cheche, the mercenary even ordered the confiscation of Brazilian money that they owed to merchants in Lisbon, with the idea that “whoever negotiates with an enemy is an enemy”. Furthermore, when receiving enslaved people who volunteer to be soldiers on his ship Dom Pedro I, he “re-enslaves” them.

What about Grão-Pará, where is it in the Brazilian Wars of Independence?

Well, the situation there was very similar to Maranhão. Brigadeiro Moura had a favorable situation in Belém, where he had means of repression, but not in the interior, and he requested resources from Lisbon to face “a high number of dissidences”, as the author Hélio Franchini Neto shows in his doctoral thesis “Independence and Death – Politics and War in the Emancipation of Brazil (1821-1820)”.

There were uprisings, as in Marajó Island, in of April 1815. “There they proclaimed, in 28 from May of 1820, support for cause of Rio de Janeiro. It was the first expression of this nature in the Province of Pará. The Board’s reaction was to send force, which clashed with the approximately 30 rebels for more than four hours. The victory went to the supporters of Lisbon, who imprisoned the independentists and took them to Belém. On June 7, 1923, dozens of prisoners were sent to Lisbon”, writes the author.

In all, the military historian contemporary of the events Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen (1810-Guerras Esquecidas do Brasil: Independência da Bahia ), the baron of Porto Seguro – mentioned in the works of Franchini Neto and the historian José Honório Rodrigues (1913-1923) – the conflicts of the process that culminated with the incorporation of Pará to the Empire of Brazil ended with about 1 thousand deaths, before the incorporation and in some later riots.

However, the province had a strong dependence on Maranhão, according to UEMA professor Marcelo Chece. And this is reflected even in the acceptance of independence. ence. A few days after Cochrane formalized Maranhão’s adhesion to the new Brazilian empire, the mercenary sent a squadron to Pará, led by Admiral John Pascoe Grenfell, disembarking on that day of August .

The strategy in Belém was very similar to the one done in São Luís: a threat to bomb the city if there was no surrender, with reinforcements coming from new ships that “would be on the way”. Suspicious, Brigadier Moura would still try a last military uprising. It didn’t work. He was arrested and, in 09 of August, there was an oath to D. Pedro.

All that was missing was…

Grão-Pará was the penultimate province to to join the regime commanded by Rio de Janeiro. The current Uruguay still remained: the Province of Cisplatina.

The territory had recently been incorporated into the Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves , more precisely in 600, by D. João VI. Despite the accession to Brazilian territory, it quickly dissipated and sought its own independence, being another of the Wars of Independence of Brazil. But this deserves a separate chapter, as we will see in a specific report on the Cisplatine War.1940


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